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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DIAMOND T UTAH, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plainti f /-Appellant, 
vs. 
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY 
COMP ANY, a corporation 
authorized to do business 
in the State of Utah, 
PACIFIC FINANCE 
CORPORATION, a corporation 
authorized to do business in 
the State of Utah, 
Defendant-Respondents. 
Case No. 
10951 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, 
PACIFIC FINANCE CORPORATION 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Respondent, Pacific Fin an c e Corporation, 
agrees with appellant's statement of the case. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
In the pretrial order, R. 38, it is stated: 
"In addition to the agreements set forth 
in the deposition of Mr. Wilkinson the plain-
tiff will further contend that as far as Pacific 
Finance is concerned that the past dealings 
1 
and past conduct on the part of both the plain-
tiff and Pacific will have some effect on con-
struing the agreements in question." 
Appellant then made a motion for summary 
judgment, which is recognized in the Addendum to 
Pretrial Order, R.37, upon the ground that there is 
no substantial question of fact, there is only a ques-
tion of law. 
Since appellant's assertion concerning the past 
conduct of the parties was not a matter put in issue 
in the pleadings and was in the form of an offer of 
proof in the event of trial, its motion for summary 
judgment can only be regarded as an abandonment 
of the claim to present extraneous evidence to aid in 
the interpretation of the agreements. It is notewor-
thy that appellant presented no affidavits or evi-
dentiary facts in any form whatsoever to support 
this assertion. 
Aside from the foregoing matter, respondent, 
Pacific Finance Corporation agrees with appellant's 
statement except that the trial court granted a sum· 
mary judgment in favor of both respondents. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent, Pacific Finance Corporation, seeks 
affirmation of the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment in its favor. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent, Pacific Finance Corporation, be-
lieves the facts as presented by appellant need fur-
2 
ther clarification, although respondent agrees with 
the facts insofar as appellant has presented them. 
The continuing unconditional guarantee agree-
ment, R.144,145, was a blanket type contract that 
was intended by the parties to cover all of the Dia-
mond T sales that would subsequently be turned 
over to Pacific Finance. R.154. The conditional 
sales contract, R.146,148, between one David Scott 
and appellant was assigned to Pacific pursuant to 
this blanket agreement. R.15'7. 
The president of appellant corporation, who 
executed the guarantee agreement in response to a 
question as to whose responsibility it was to collect 
the amounts due and owing under the conditional 
sales contract stated that he had given an uncondi-
tional guarantee and if they (Pacific) don't collect 
from him, then I have to pay it. R.161. When quer-
ied further about the guarantee agreement, he stat.. 
ed that there is a continuing guarantee agreement 
separate from the assignment. R.161. 
It should be further pointed out that the so call-
ed Assignment and Repurchase Agreement were 
simply provisions contained in the standard condi-
tional sales contract used by appellant in the sale of 
the trailer and tractor to one David Scott. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE DOCTRINE OF PRACTICAL CONSTRUC-
TION CANNOT BE INVOKED BY APPEL-
LANT BECAUSE THE CONTINUING UNCON-
3 
DITIONAL GUARANTE'E CONTRACT IS UN-
AMBIGUOUS AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE 
OF ANY CONDUCT BY THE PARTIES WHICH 
CREATES AN APP ARENT CONFLICT WITH 
THE TERMS OF THE GUARANTEE. 
POINT II 
UNDER THE TERMS OF THE CONTINUING 
UNCONDITIONAL GUARANTEE AGREE-
MENT, APPELLANT IS LIABLE UPON DE-
MAND OF PAYMENT BY PACIFIC FINANCE, 
WITHOUT LIMITATION. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DOCTRINE OF PRACTICAL CONSTRUC-
TION CANNOT BE INVOKED BY APPEL-
LANT BECAUSE THE CONTINUING UNCON-
DITIONAL GUARANTEE CONTRACT IS UN-
AMBIGUOUS AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE 
OF ANY CONDUCT BY THE PARTIES WHICH 
CREATES AN APP ARENT CONFLICT WITH 
THE TERMS OF THE GUARANTEE. 
The doctrine of practical construction cannot 
be invoked by appellant because the continuing un-
conditional guarantee contract is unambiguous and 
there is no evidence of any conduct by the parties 
which creates an apparent conflict with the terms 
of the guarantee. 
There are two contracts in evidence before the 
court, one is a continuing unconditional guarantee 
agreement which incorporates an assignment with 
unconditional guarantee. R.144,145. The other is a 
conditional sales contract, providing for the sale of 
a trailer and tractor to one David Scott, which con· 
tains an assignment and repurchase agreement. 
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R.146,148. Appellant contends that there is sub-
stantial uncertainty and ambiguity as to which of 
these contracts is the agreement between the par-
ties. In essence, appellant argues that by the conduct 
of the parties they have demonstrated their mean-
ing and intent to be bound by the provisions in the 
conditional sales contract. The alleged past conduct 
which appellant claims supports its contention is 
not verified by appellant by any reference to the 
record, and as previously noted is merely an unsub-
stantiated assertion by counsel. Respondent, Pacific 
Finance vigorously disagrees with appellant's argu-
ment and asserts that appellant is attempting to 
nullify a continuing unconditional guarantee agree-
ment between the parties, which by its express terms 
states that notwithstanding any assignments ap-
pearing on any conditional sales contract, the ap-
pellant's assignment shall be deemed an uncondition-
al guarantee assignment. 
Appellant does not contend that the uncondi-
tional guarantee has been terminated or altered, but 
on the contrary appears to admit it is a presently 
existing agreement. Appellant simply contends that 
every significant term in the contract has been ab-
rogated by some form of conduct, of which appellant 
has not presented a scintilla of evidence to substan-
tiate. 
Appellant has cited Bullough vs. Sims, 16 Utah 
2d 304,400 P.2d 20, 22-23 ( 1965) and the cases 
cited therein as its authority for its argument. Pa-
5 
cific contends that the Bullough case with its rule 
of practical construction is inapplicable in the in-
stant action. The Bullough case states that where 
the terms of an agreement are unambiguous, parol 
evidence cannot alter or change its plain meaning. 
However, there are exceptions to this rule, ''* * * one 
of which is that when the parties place their own 
construction on it and so perform, the court may 
consider this persuasive evidence of what their true 
intention was." 
In the Bullough case, the court observed that 
the parties had demonstrated by their conduct for 
twenty eight years their interpretation of the agree-
ment. The court stated: 
" 'Appellants correctly claim that this 
doctrine of practical construction can only be 
applied when the contract is ambiguous, and 
cannot be used when the contract is unambig-
uous. This is undoubtedly a correct general 
statement of the law. (Citations omitted). 
But the question involved in such cases is am-
biguous to whom? ... Thus, even if it be as-
sumed that the words standing alone might 
mean one thing to the members of this cour.t, 
where the parties have demonstrated by their 
actions and performance that to them the con-
tract meant something quite different, the 
meaning and intent sho~ld be en~orced .. In 
such a si tua ti on the parties by their actions 
have created the "ambiguity" required to 
b . th 1 . t t' * * *' " rmg e ru e m o opera ion. 
Another factor involved in the doctrine is: 
"A practical construction of the terms of 
6 
a contract by the parties thereto implies a 
mutual and identical interpretation." Hodges 
Irr. Co. vs. Swan Creek Canal Co. 111 Utah 
405, 181 P2d 217, 220 (1947). 
The doctrine of practical construction is inap-
plicable in the instant case. In the Bullough case the 
court simply found that the parties by their actions 
had created an ambiguity and therefore the court 
adopted their interpretation of the agreement as 
demonstrated by the conduct of the parties over a 
period of twenty eight years. Appellant under the 
guise of this doctrine is asking the court to hold 
that both parties have demonstrated through their 
conduct that they intended the unconditional guar-
antee agreement to be a nullity. 
In the instant action, even if Pacific had pre-
viously repossessed and delivered the vehicles prior 
to seeking recourse on the assignment, this conduct 
does not alter the meaning and intent of the parties 
as expressed in the unconditional guarantee. 
The Assignment With Unconditional Guaran-
tee, R.145, provides: "* * * I guarantee and will 
pay assignee or holder upon demand all amounts due 
and to become due by the terms of said contract, 
* * *" (Emphasis added). 
The conduct of repossession and delivery alone 
is not significant if respondent had simply not elect-
ed to make a demand previously; for appellant was 
not obligated to pay prior to demand. However, if 
the parties' interpretation of the guarantee agree-
7 
ment as demonstrated by their conduct were that as 
a condition precedent to a demand for payment, re-
spondent must repossess and deliver the vehicle 
' 
there might be an ambiguity, since the guarantee is 
unconditional. Appellant has not made this conten-
tion; instead it has in effect asserted that the par-
ties have through their conduct abandoned the guar- 1 
antee agreement and intended to be bound in their 
future business transactions by the provisions con-
tained in a single conditional sales contract of one 
tractor and trailer. The evidence of such conduct 
being an unsubstantiated assertion by counsel for 
appellant at the pretrial. 
Another factor of significance that militates 
against appellant's strained interpretation is the 
provision "This unconditional guarantee is contin-
uing in nature until terminated by five days prior 
written notice served upon Pacific Finance Corpor· 
ation. * * *" R.144. 
Appellant has asserted that the language ap· 
pearing in a single conditional sales contract be· 
tween appellant and David Scott was intended by 
the parties to be the determinative document in 
controlling their extended business relations, al· 
though the parties had entered into a master agree· 
ment to regulate their future business transactions, 
and Diamond T could have terminated such master 
agreement merely by serving a written notice on 
Pacific. 
8 
Respondent, Pacific's strongest argument is the 
Continuing Unconditional Guarantee Agreement, 
itself. R. 144,145. 
".I (or we), ?ereby agree that, notwith-
stan~i~ig any assignments appearing on any 
?onditwnal sales contract or any other exist-
mg agreements between myself and Pacific 
Finance Corporation, my assignments shall 
be deemed an unconditional guarantee assign-
nient on any contract of conditional sale here-
after assigned to and purchased by Pacific 
Finance Corporation from me, * * * 
"The terms and provisions of this uncon-
ditional guarantee assignment shall be the 
same as those which * * * appear on the re-
verse side of this agreement and by this re-
ference is made a part hereof. 
* * *" (Emphasis added) 
Appellant has asserted that there is a conflict 
in the provisions of the two contracts, and therefore, 
the court must determine by which contract the par-
ties are bound. The foregoing emphasized language 
of the guarantee agreement clearly indicates that 
the parties realized that there might be language in 
the assignment clauses of individual conditional sales 
contracts which would be at variance with the un-
conditional guarantee and therefore they expressly 
stated their intent as to the agreement by which they 
should be bound. 
The statement in Ephraim Theatre Company 
vs. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d 163, 321 P2d 221, 223 (1958) 
is applicable in the instant case: 
9 
. ''In consid~ring the controversy here it 
IS well to keep m mind the fundamental con-
cepts _in regard to contracts; that their pur-
pose Is to reduce to writing the conditions 
upon which the minds of the parties have met 
and to fix their rights and duties in respect 
thereto. The intent so expressed is to be found 
if possible, within the four corners of the in~ 
strument itself in accordance with the ordin-
ary accepted meaning of the words used. Un-
less there is ambiguity or uncertainty in the 
language so that the meaning is confused, or 
is susceptible of more than one meaning, there 
is no justification for interpretation or ex-
planation from extraneous sources. It would 
defeat the very purpose of formal contracts 
to permit a party to invoke the use of words 
or conduct inconsistent with its terms to prove 
that the parties did not mean what they said 
or to use such inconsistent words or conduct 
to demonstrate uncertainty or ambiguity 
where none would otherwise exist. Generally 
speaking, neither of the parties, nor the court 
has any right to ignore or modify conditions 
which are clearly expressed merely because it 
may subject one of the parties to hardship, 
but they must be enforced 'in accordance with 
the intention as * * * manifested by the Ian· 
guage used by the parties to the contract'." 
Although it is respondent, Pacific's contention 
that there is no uncertainty or ambiguity which 
would justify an interpretation from extraneous 
sources as to the intent of the parties to the guaran-
tee agreement; there is significant testimony as to 
the intent of Oral J. Wilkinson, the President of 
appellant, who executed the guarantee. 
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"Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
I ~ake it tp~n y~u have had an agreement 
with Pacific Fmance for some time to 
purchase your contracts? 
Since about 1959 or '8, along in there. 
You mentioned to me a few minutes ago 
that this was under a contract which you 
had with Pacific Finance, which I under-
stand it is a blanket type contract that 
would cover almost all of your sales that 
you would subsequently turn over to Pa-
cific Finance? 
Yes. It is a guarantee by the corporation 
and then a guarantee by myself to repur-
chase the paper if it is not paid out by 
the individual. 
That is the contract that you are trying 
to locate here now, is it? 
Yes." R.154, lines 18-30; R.155, line 1. 
* * * 
"Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
* * * 
Do you recall if this conditional sales con-
tract was subsequently assigned or sold 
to Pacific Finance? 
Yes, it was. 
And was this pursuant to this contract 
that you had with them? 
You mean fallowing that contract, was it 
under that agreement? 
Yes, under that agreement. 
Yes." R.157, lines 15-23. 
I noticed on the conditional sale contract 
that there is no assignment as such. 
11 
Would it be correct to state that there 
was a separate assignment agreement 
that was entered into? 
A. Yes. That was part of this agreement 
that I am trying to locate." R.160, lines 
19-23. 
* * * 
"Q. I take it from what you have indicated 
to me that if the Pacific Finance gets the 
contract, gets the conditional sale con-
tract, and I suppose they receive the title 
too, it is their responsibility to collect the 
amounts due and owing under the con-
tract? 
A. I give them an unconditional guarantee 
and if they don't collect from him, then I 
have to pay it. 
Q. Do you have a copy of that guarantee 
agreement? 
A. That is all in one agreement. 
Q. Is it still in the same agreement we are 
talking about? 
A. Yes. There is a personal continuing guar-
antee agreement separate from the as-
signment; but there are two, one corpor-
ate and one personal." R.161, lines 8-20. 
Appellant has shown no grounds upon which to 
invoke the doctrine of practical construction in the 
instant case. The facts of Bullough vs. Sims are en-
tirely different for there the court simply admitted 
evidence of the conduct of the parties to determine 
what they meant and intended their agreement to 
be. In the instant action, the appellant has attempt· 
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ed to use the doctrine to interpret the continuing 
guarantee out of existence. The guarantee agree-
ment is clear and unambiguous and has by its ex-
press terms stated in case of a conflict such as here 
which contract provisions are controlling. There is 
no basis for appellant to introduce extraneous evi-
dence in the interpretation of the guarantee con-
tract. Respondent contends that in the instant case 
the language of Clyde vs. Eddington Canning Co., 
10 Utah 2d 14, 347 P2d 563 (1959) is controlling. 
"* * * Under the clear language of the 
writing we are not impressed with such con-
tention, particularly since intentions cannot 
vary the terms of clear, concise, unambiguous 
language employed by him who says he did 
not intend what he said." 
POINT II 
UNDER THE TERMS OF THE CONTINUING 
UNCONDITIONAL GUARANTEE AGREE -
MENT, APPELLANT IS LIABLE UPON DE-
MAND OF PAYMENT BY PACIFIC FINANCE, 
WITHOUT LIMITATION. 
Under the terms of the continuing uncondition-
al guarantee agreement, appellant is liable upon de-
mand of payment by Pacific Finance, without limi-
tation. 
The continuing unconditional guarantee agree-
ment between Diamond T and Pacific Finance, un-
der which the conditional sales contract of David 
Scott was assigned, constitutes an absolute under-
taking on the part of appellant to pay all amounts 
due or to become due under the contract, together 
13 
with all costs and attorneys' fees incurred in enforc-
ing said contract on collecting or attempting to col-
lect money thereunder. R.145. The agreement fur-
ther provides : 
. "* *. * and I agree to delay or indulgence 
m enforcmg payment, and to the release, sur-
render or substitution of collateral; diligence, 
presentment, protest and demand notice of 
sale and notice of every kind are hereby waiv-
ed, all without affecting the liability of the 
undersigned hereunder. * * *" 
There was also in effect at the time of the as-
signment of the conditional sales contract to Pacific, 
an insurance agreement. ( R.14 7) , whereby appel-
lant agreed that all conditional sales contracts pur-
chased by Pacific from appellant would be covered 
for the term thereof with insurance in such types 
and amounts as set forth. Under the terms and con· 
ditions of this insurance agreement, Pacific did not 
have a duty to purchase insurance. 
It is Pacific's position that since it had no duty 
to furnish insurance, and under the unconditional 
guarantee agreement, the appellant remained liable 
to Pacific, even if Pacific completely released the 
collateral securing the conditional sales contract as· 
signed to respondent, Pacific was entitled to judg· 
ment as a matter of law. 
The nature of a guaranty was described by the 
court in Rucker vs. Republic Supply Company, 
Okla., 415 P2d 951, 953, 954 (1966) in the follow· 
ing language : 
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"A guaranty is deemed continuing if it 
c.on~emplates a future course of dealings, not 
limited to a single transaction for an indefin-
ite period of time, * * * or until it is revoked 
* * *. A continuing guaranty is deemed a 
repetition of the extension of credit so long 
as it is enforced. Liability under a continuing 
guarantee will be deemed to have continued 
until revoked where it contains no express 
limitation as to duration of Guarantor's re-
sponsibility, 24 Am. Jr. Guaranty, Sec. 63 
and 38 C.J.S. Guaranty, §53. A guaranty is 
deemed unconditional unless its terms import 
a condition precedent to liability, (Citations 
Omitted). 
"The intent of the parties to a guaranty 
is to be collected from the whole instrument, 
(Citations Omitted). Where the language of 
a contract of guaranty is clear and explicit, 
its purpose and meaning must be ascertained 
therefrom, without resort to extrinsic evi-
dence, (Citations Omitted). 
* * * 
"* * * this court has frequently held that 
in construing a guarantee to determine the in-
tent of the parties, it should be taken rrwst 
strongly against the Guarantor and in favor 
of the Creditor, (Citations Omitted)." (Em-
phasis added). 
Also see Hallstrom vs. Buhler, 14 Utah 2d 111, 
114, 378 P2d 355 (1963). 
In the United States vs. Anderson, 366 F2d 
569,571 (1966, C.A. 10th), the court observed: 
"'The law is well settled that a guaranty 
is a collateral agreement to pay a debt or per-
form a duty for another in case of default 
15 
which may be enforced separately from the 
primary obligation. It is not necessary to pro-
ceed against the primary debtor. An uncon-
ditional guaranty is one whereby the guaran-
tor agrees to pay or perform a contract upon 
default of the principal without limitation. 
It is an absolute undertaking to pay a debt 
at maturity or perform an agreement if the 
principal does not pay or perform. * * *" 
In the instant action appellant has attempted 
to engraft all types of limitations upon its uncondi-
tional guarantee agreement. Appellant has contend-
ed that Pacific must first proceed against the pri-
mary debtor by obtaining possession and delivery 
of the security, before seeking payment. Appellant 
has further disclaimed liability under the guarantee 
because Pacific did not procure insurance on the 
vehicle or store it properly. As respondent Pacific 
has already contended, since it was empowered to 
release completely the security under the guarantee 
agreement, appellant's contentions that Pacific was 
compelled to fulfill these other obligations prior to 
seeking payment is without merit. 
Where the guaranty is an absolute one, it is not 
a defense to the guarantor that the creditor has been 
negligent in regard to protecting and enforcing col-
lateral security. 38 CJS Guaranty, §81, p. 1251; Na-
tion Wide Inc. vs. Scullin, 256 F. Supp. 929, 932, 
933 (1966 D.C.D. N.J.); A. & T. Motors, Inc. vs. 
Roemelmeyer, Florida, 158 So. 2d 567, 570 (1964); 
United States vs. Klebe Tool & Die Co., 5 Wis. 2d 
392, 92 NW2d 868, 871 (1958). 
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The reasoning supporting this rule is that the 
rights and liabilities are fixed by the contract of 
guaranty. The risk of the guarantor is not increased 
where the obligation is absolute and unconditional; 
and by its terms the creditor may make an entire 
release of the security and still recover from the 
guarantor. Therefore, regardless of any negligence 
on the part of the creditor, he is entitled to recover 
on an absolute guaranty; for upon default of the 
principal, the guarantor is immediately liable. 
There are two cases from the Tenth Circuit 
which clearly illustrate this point: 
Joe Heaston Tractor & Imp. Co. vs. Securities 
Acceptance Corp., 243 F2d 197 (1957, CA 10th). 
In this case, Securities Acceptance, a finance 
company sued Heaston, the guarantor upon a con-
tract which guaranteed payments due to the finance 
company from one Claussen, the debtor. The guar-
antor sold an appliance store, along with certain in-
debtedness of the guarantor to the finance company. 
The debtor needed financing in order to complete 
the transaction. To induce the finance company to 
furnish the necessary financing, the guarantor "un-
conditionally guaranteed" the payments of all ac-
counts then owed by the debtor to the finance com-
pany and those to be incurred in the future. The 
finance company made loans to the debtor and took 
back chattel mortgages, which were never filed. The 
debtor was adjudicated bankrupt. The finance com-
pany demanded payment from the guarantor in ac-
17 
cordance with the guaranty agreement. The guaran. 
tor pleaded that since the finance company failed to 
perfect the liens, the subrogation rights of the guar. 
antor were lost, and the guarantor was released 
from its obligation. 
The court stated: 
"The contract of guaranty makes refer-
ence to secured loans but it does not specific. 
ally require the taking of mortgages or that 
the same, if taken, be recorded. Relying upon 
the law of suretyship as propounded in 
Stearns on Law of Suretyship, 5th Ed., 188, 
§6.49, and 50 Am. Jur., Suretyship, §118, the 
Guarantor contends that the contract contem-
plates that security for loans will be taken 
and that in such cases there is an implied 
agreement that the lien of the security will 
be preserved by proper filing or recording, a 
failure of which relieves a guarantor to the 
extent of the loss sustained. We are of the 
opinion that the guaranty agreement is an 
absolute and unconditional guaranty and the 
foregoing rule of law has no application. 
"It is quite clear that the agreement cov· 
ered every kind of retail sale upon which the 
Finance Company advanced money. It spe· 
cifically guarantees, without limitation or 
condition, the prompt performance by the 
Debtor of all obligations and commitments to 
the Finance Company with respect to all re· 
tail paper by endorsement, or otherwise. Full 
power was granted to the Finance Company 
to modify or change the terms of any of the 
liabilities and to release any collateral there· 
to Under the broad terms of this guaranty 
18 
agreement, the Debtor and the Finance Com-
pany were free to handle their commercial 
pape~ as they saw fit. We think the guaranty 
was mtended to cover, without condition, all 
good-faith loans made to the Debtor by the 
Finance Company in connection with the Deb-
tor's appliance business in which commercial 
paper was taken. Otherwise there would have 
been no reason to include in the contract the 
provision that the Guarantor 'unconditionally 
guarantees * * *, the due and punctual pay-
ment' of all notes evidencing floor plan fi-
nancing transactions and 'further guarantees 
the prompt performance' of all obligations and 
commitments of the Debtor under any 'en-
dorsement to or repurchase agreement exe-
cuted by the Dealer to the Finance Company 
with respect to any retail paper. * * *' The 
record does not disclose what the security re-
quirements are or what the custom is under 
general floor plan arrangements. Presumably 
they would differ in individual cases. 
" ... A definition of conditional and un-
conditional contracts of guaranty and the lia-
bility of guarantors under them is well stated 
by this Court in Pavlantos vs. Garouf al is, 89 
F2d 203, 206, where it is said: 
'Contracts of guaranty are divided 
into two kinds. One is absolute or uncon-
ditional and the other is conditional. An 
absolute guarantee is an unconditional 
undertaking on the part of the guarantor 
that the person primarily obligated will 
make payment or perform, and such guar-
antor is liable immediately upon default 
of the principal without notice. A condi-
tional guaranty is an undertaking to pay 
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or perform if. payment or performance 
c.annot be obtamed from the principal ob. 
hgor by reasonable diligence. * * * (Citing 
cases) An absolute guaranty unlike a 
conditional one, casts no duty upon the 
creditor or holder of the obligation to at. 
tempt collection from the principal debtor 
before looking to the guarantor. (Ci ta· 
tions omitted) Both presuppose default 
by the principal.' 
"The guaranty was not gratuitous. The 
Trial Court found the guaranty was neces-
sary to enable the Debtor to finance the pur· 
chase of the business. At the time the Guar-
antor sold the appliance business to the Deb-
tor, there was owing to the Finance Company 
approximately $35,000. As an integral part 
of the sale, the Guarantor, by its guaranty, 
induced the Finance Company to extend floor 
plan financing to the Debtor and to continue 
loans which had been assumed by the Debtor 
on the purchase of the business. Considering 
the contract as a whole, the purpose for which 
it was given, together with all the surround· 
ing circumstances existing at the time the 
guaranty was executed, we think it was the 
intention of the contracting parties that upon 
default the Guarantor was unconditionally 
bound to pay the liabilities of the Debtor as 
described in the guaranty instrument." 
The second case is precisely in point and deals 
with the issue of whether it was negligent of the 
creditor not to procure insurance on the security 
after the debtor had allowed the policy to lapse. 
United States vs. Newton Livestock Auction 
Market, Inc., 336 F2d 673 ( 1964, CA 10th). 
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In this case the Small Business Administration 
(S.B.A.), an agency of the United States, lent 
money to Newton Livestock Auction Market, Inc., 
(Newton) which was secured by mortgages on Kan-
sas real and chattel property and by three separate 
guaranty agreements. The government sued to fore-
close the mortgage and joined as defendants Newton 
and the guarantors. After the judgment of foreclos-
ure, but prior to the sale, the property was damaged 
by a severe windstorm. 
The mortgages required Newton to insure the 
property. After the foreclosure action was brought 
Newton notified the insurance carrier that it could 
not pay a premium due. The insurer notified the 
S.B.A., who replied by letter that the policy should 
lapse. The termination of the policy occurred more 
than six months before the storm damage. The mort-
gage provided that if the mortgagor did not keep 
the property insured, the United States as mort-
gagee had the option to effect insurance, and the 
cost incurred was an additional lien against the 
property. The trial court credited against the judg-
ment obtained by the S.B.A. the $30,000 storm dam-
age. The appellate court observed that the positions 
of the mortgagor and guarantors are different and 
require different treatment. 
Newton asserted that the United States under-
took to insure the property and thereby became li-
able to it. The court stated that all the S.B.A. did 
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was to elect to bear the risk of possible loss of its 
security. The court stated at page 677: ! 
'''The statutory power of S.B.A. to insure 
and ~harge the co~t to the mortgagor did not 
reqmre S.B.A. to msure for the benefit of the 
mortgagor. The policies lapsed when Newton 
failed to pay the premiums; the S.B.A. was 
~nder no obligation to insure; and it did noth· 
mg more than assume the hazard of impair· 
ment in value of its collateral. Newton the 
mortgagor, is entitled to no credit on the fudg-
ment because of the storm loss. 
"On the theory of increased risk the \ 
guarantors contend that they were released, i 
either fully or to the extent of the storm darn· 1 age, by the action of the United States in per·! 
mitting the insurance to lapse. Their reliance 
on 'equities' and general principles of law are 
unpersuasive because their rights and liabil-
ities are fixed by the contracts of guaranty. 
The risk of the guarantors was not increased 
because their obligations were absolute and 
unconditional. By the terms of the guaranty 
contracts S.B.A. could have made an entire 
release of the security for the loan and still 
have recovered from the guarantors. Lack of 
notice of mortgagor's default in its obligation 
to insure is important because the guarantors 
expressly waived notice of any default by the 
mortgagor. The guarantors have failed to 
show the breach of any duty owed to them. 
They have no right to a credit because of the 
storm damage." 
The foregoing cases clearly illustrate the nature 
of an unconditional guarantee, and the appellant 
cannot under the terms of the guarantee agreement 
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it executed impose conditions or duties upon Pacific 
in order to disclaim liability. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Appellant has claimed in its conclusion that if 
Pacific had the ownership interest when the vehicle 
was stolen, Diamond T had no liability prior to the 
return of the vehicle. Under the continuing uncon-
ditional guarantee agreement the ownership would 
be irrelevant, since Pacific was empowered to re-
lease the security completely. The trial court prop-
erly interpreted a clear, concise, unambiguous doc-
ument, the guarantee agreement, without the aid 
of extrinsic evidence. Furthermore, there was no 
relevant evidence of record before the court indicat-
ing any ambiguity demonstrated by the conduct of 
the parties. On the other hand, there were state-
ments af record by the president of appellant that 
the conditional sales contract of David Scott was 
assigned to Pacific pursuant to the guarantee agree-
ment. Appellant by its execution of the guarantee 
agreement undertook an absolute obligation to pay 
upon default of the principal without limitation. 
The trial court properly concluded that appellant 
had not stated a cause of action against Pacific Fi-
nance Corporation. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LOUIS H. CALLISTER, JR. 
800 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for 
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Defendant-Respondent 
Pacific Finance Corp. 
